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The discussion on nudging is usually framed as a discussion about autonomy vs.
paternalism. This is suggested by the fact that nudging addresses the individual and
aims at influencing their behavior in fields in which we cannot expect rational self-
determination. Nudging is designed to result in behavior which the individual would
not have shown on their own.
The strong focus on the individual and the orientation of the discussion within the
matrix autonomy/paternalism is very interesting against the background of our self-
conception. However, it is misguided as a basis for a discussion about nudging as
a regulatory approach. In almost all relevant cases in which nudging is discussed,
we do not merely protect citizens from themselves. We regard individual behavior
which does not harm third parties directly, but nevertheless has significant social
impact. The modern welfare state transforms individual risks into social problems.
Poverty triggers a right to social benefits, illness entitles to medical care and both
are financed by tax-payers or at least other members of society. We could extend
the list to all kinds of contingencies in which we are entitled to support. The welfare
state has linked individual risky behavior to matters of social infrastructure and social
justice.
We find this link wherever nudging is discussed. Nudging has not been developed
to prevent people from irresponsible borrowing because we care about individual
waste of money. Rather the objective is the prevention of extensive debts which
lead to insolvency which in turn triggers social responses targeted at helping the
individual and preventing instability of the financial sector. Thus, nudging is not just
about protecting citizens from themselves, moreover, it is about effective solutions
for social problems.
The search for an adequate approach to a social problem is the standard case of
regulation. Parallel to all other kinds of regulation it calls for a political decision on
whether or not nudging should be chosen as an instrument to remedy the social
costs entailed with individual behavior.
One focus in this political debate should be on the alternative of educating versus
nudging. The more we are interested merely in a desirably outcome and the less
we care about the underlying values of our behaviour, the more we might be
inclined to use effective nudging. Healthy meals in the cafeteria might be a case in
point. However, the more we want a behavior to be backed by a specific attitude,
the more we might favor education despite its inefficiencies. Wherever we try to
influence decisions that are closely linked to important values of self-perception or to
societal values there is more at stake than just the outcome. If we think about organ-
donation, for instance, we are not just interested in a high number of organ-donators
but we would very much like donation to confirm solidarity in society and we know
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that the decision affects personal values. If this is the case, we should not use an
opt-out design but rather force people to make a well-informed decision.
From a legal point of view, in cases of nudging has to be reviewed whether this
measure chosen is not a disproportionate loss of freedom for the individual. This
requires balancing of interests. The most important point of reference for this
balancing is an alternative coercive measure. In cases in which we would also
accept coercive measures, nudging should be regarded as an acceptable means.
Nudging fits into the tradition of rational policy-making and should be treated
accordingly. The contrast of “autonomy/paternalism” conceals the quite ordinary
character of the regulatory issue – which in addition touches the individual sphere of
freedom only slightly.
If the relevant situations for nudging are those in which choices have social impact,
nudging is a matter of politics and we have to discuss it in the political arena. For
any political deliberation, transparency is crucial. A call for transparency is already
made by the initiators of the nudging discourse. However, their call for transparency
is based on respecting the autonomy of the people who are nudged. From this angle,
transparency is only needed as far as the interaction between government and the
citizen is concerned. When focusing on the area of political deliberations, however,
the issue of transparency concerns the legitimate goals and the design of nudging.
It relates to the instrumental choice, the field of application, the specific concepts,
mechanisms of evaluation etc. And decisions on all these questions require public
accountability. Nudging addresses situations in which we do not behave rationally.
Nonetheless, we can rationally discuss whether we would like to be nudged or
not. This is the very reason for the conference and for the same reason political
deliberation is as much needed as it is possible.
In this regard nudging can pose problems. It can seep into institutions and subvert
constitutional mechanisms that ensure transparent public debate. This is mainly
because the loss of individual freedom of the person nudged is comparatively scant.
By the way, nudging is quite a misleading term. If you are nudged, you do feel it –
especially if it is an elephant that nudges you. If you are successfully manipulated in
your automatic behaviour, you do not feel anything.
In any case, as the loss of individual freedom is usually minor, we require no action
by the legislator and consequently there is no public debate in Parliament. However,
this problem pertains merely to interaction between citizen and state. As far as
regulatory nudging in private relationships is concerned, regularly there are duties
imposed on one party, such as a specific design of default options, and they require
legislative action. And even regarding the relationship between citizen and state, it
can be well argued that a systematic employment of nudging by public authorities
can give rise to a new, distinct quality of the approach, which would require specific
legal answers. As we well know, the phenomenon of privatization entailed similar
problems.
Overall, nudging receives so much attention because it incorporates fresh
knowledge generated by the emerging field of behavioral economics. The nudging
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discourse aims at using it for policy-making in a new form. Questions of individual
bias and overconfidence for instance had already been discussed in the discourse
on risk-regulation in the 1990ies. But in this discourse, they had been spread
with the goal of informational education. Pointing out misleading risk-perceptions
was supposed to result in acceptance of rational risk-management. Nowadays
such problems are perceived as facets of fundamental problems of individual self-
determination. The nudging discourse emphasizes the inevitability of such deficits
and makes them available for rational policy design. As a result, the toolbox of
rational policy-making will be stocked more extensively. This has happened before,
when welfare economics led to fees and certificates as elements of environmental
policy and when institutional economics provided information on sound governance
structures. With regard to this genealogy, however, we should not be surprised
if initial euphoria will be followed by disillusionment. Economic knowledge does
not lead us towards unambiguous conclusions and so we may once again have to
realize that rational policy-making is but an ideal of modern societies.
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